Abstract
1 This maxim captures the contributions of Haim Bodek: his efforts to understand the transformation of the securities industry and the phenomenon of high-frequency trading (HFT), his advocacy for reforming the architecture of securities markets, and his role as a whistleblower alerting the regulators and general public about certain questionable practices of high-frequency traders (HFTs) and trading venues. 2 In addition to the media exposure, Bodek's recent book is an insider's account offering a unique perspective on the rapid evolution of the securities market structure as a complex interaction of regulatory and technological forces, the pivotal role played by HFT in this process, and the impact of these changes on other market participants.
by evaluating Bodek's contributions from the standpoint of the existing tools of federal securities law and the outlook for the future regulatory design.
II. THE ORDER TYPE CONTROVERSY
Bodek's overarching contribution pertains to the order type controversya critical inquiry into causes and implications of the expanding menu of execution commands and their design 7 -and to use his own analogy, some practices relating to order types are like a matchup of chess pieces and ignorant checkers pieces. 8 Bodek's realization of the significance of certain order type practices leading to their subsequent exposure has been making waves, 9 and, without any doubt, the SEC's ongoing investigation of "how requests for order types are enacted, vetted and approved at each exchange before they get to the Commission" 10 can be traced back to him. 11 The order type controversy was also one of the key points in the recent congressional hearings, 12 in which a
Rule 10b-5, is perhaps the cornerstone of the antifraud framework and the key driver of private securities litigation, for which the availability of an implied private right of action has been universally recognized. 8. BODEK, supra note 3, at 13. Interestingly, one of the earliest proposals to expand the order type menu aimed at protecting certain types of market participants, such as exchange specialists and retail traders, from arbitragers as proto-HFTs. Merton H. Miller, Index Arbitrage and Volatility, FIN. ANALYSTS J., JulyAug. 1990, at 6. The same author also remarked that, "[g]iven the wonders of electronics, the limit-order book could be programmed to handle a wide variety of new kinds of customer contingency orders." Id. at 7. 12. newspaper article discussing Bodek's exposure of these practices was referenced. 13 Even a representative of a leading securities industry group admitted that "there are predatory order types that some may argue also add liquidity, but get in the way of institutional orders," 14 which is another illustration of the paradigm shift pioneered by Bodek. More generally, there are different reasons for the growing number of order types, which now go far beyond basic market and limit orders, and, in many instances, there is nothing sinister about recent additions. As a representative of a leading securities exchange described these reasons, although leaving some ambiguity with respect to "economic results," "Some [order types] are to comply with Regulation NMS; some of them are to guarantee economic results; some of them are to compete with some of the practices, customer segmentation, et cetera, that happens off-exchange [or] to replicate certain behaviors, some of which used to happen nonelectronically." 15 Furthermore, certain order types at least partly owe their existence to the competition between securities exchanges and other trading venues, 16 as players in the latter category "use their regulatory advantage as a competitive edge to develop order functionality and this often drives client demands for Exchange order types." 17 Indeed, it is possible that the order type race emerged over a decade ago as a result of the competitive interaction of newcomers among trading venues, including electronic communication networks (ECNs) that historically have not been required to submit their order types for SEC approval. 18 A related aspect is illustrated by the assertion that 22. BODEK, supra note 3, at 3-4. On a related note, Bodek also expressed a concern over the ownership of securities exchanges by HFTs, which constitutes a serious conflict of interest. Id. at 73-74.
23. PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 237 (quoting an anonymous employee of Archipelago, which ultimately became NYSE Arca).
features:
-unfair order handling practices that permit HFTs to step ahead of investor orders in violation of price-time priority -unfair rebooking and repositioning of investor orders that permit HFTs to flip out of toxic trades -unfair conversion of investor orders eligible for maker rebates into unfavorable executions incurring taker fees [under the maker-taker pricing model] -unfair insertion of HFT intermediaries in between legitimate customer-to-customer matching -unfair and discriminatory order handling of investor orders during sudden price movements.
24
Going beyond judgments of unfairness of these order types as "shortcuts" that could have been employed only by a small subset of sophisticated and technologically equipped market participants, the key problem is that, "being central to the 'guaranteed economics' arrangement afforded HFTs [by securities exchanges], these order matching engine practices are, for the most part, undocumented."
25
Of course, "undocumented" implies "selectively disclosed," and, in Bodek's experience, "exchange marketing departments tended to segment their customer base, differentiating between institutional clients and [HFTs] . . . . [Y]ou were either marketed unfair advantages like queue-jumping or you weren't." 26 This informational asymmetry also pushed Bodek to take everything to the public arena and become a whistleblower par excellence: "The thing that really got me to be more of a critic of HFT was that the rule descriptions did not match what was going on at the exchanges." 27 Furthermore, such undocumented features could hardly have been reverseengineered:
24. BODEK, supra note 3, at 11-12; see also PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 50 (describing how these order types "acted effectively as an invisible trap that made other firms pay the 'take' fee" and how Bodek's own firm, Trading Machines, was affected).
25. BODEK, supra note 3, at 12; see also House Hearing on Market Structure, supra note 19, at 75 (prepared testimony of Kevin Cronin, Global Head of Equity Trading, Invesco) (expressing concerns that certain "order types facilitate strategies that can benefit market participants at the expense of long-term investors or that are potentially abusive or manipulative" and stating that members of the Investment Company Institute, an association of institutional investors, "report that the transparency surrounding these order types is severely lacking").
26. BODEK, supra note 3, at 9. Interestingly, these practices may not be unique to the United States. For instance, a recent commentary on securities markets in Australia quoted a government report's finding that "one or more crossing system operators may be offering specific order types to an exclusive subset of their clients and advising these clients how to benefit from these order types" and asserted that " [ [N]ot even the most sophisticated user would have been able to determine how top HFT firms employed special order types by scrutinizing exchange [application programming interface] manuals and regulatory filings. The most important details (e.g. intended usage cases, intended order interaction sequences, order precedence rules, etc.) are not documented in any adequate manner.
28
In that respect, Bodek's insights provide a very different perspective from several earlier debates over pros and cons of plainly visible features of certain over types, such as the heated debate on the "flash order" functionality 29 or the clashing views on "pegged" orders. 30 Yet another related consideration is that "speed is simply a prerequisite for effective utilization of special order types and market microstructure." 31 Conversely, "[l]iquidity seemed to dry up if you were using the right order types and strategies but were not fast enough to maneuver to get to the top of the queue." 32 Furthermore, according to Bodek, the very existence of special order types set the stage for many high-speed trading strategies: "HFT was and is all about these HFT-oriented order types, as well as other even more sophisticated derivatives of such order types. In fact, modern HFT would cease to be profitable without HFT-oriented order types." 33 In addition, Bodek argued that the importance of certain other HFT-associated practices, some of which, like layering and spoofing, could be placed more easily in the realm the traditional doctrine of market manipulation, 34 is not that great relative to "HFT scalping," a category that involves the use of special order types: Many forms of adverse selection, unexpected slippage and escalating transaction costs can be tied to specific features of HFT scalping practices and exchange order matching engine features. . . . However, the core activity of HFT scalping strategies might be inadvertently attributed to less prevalent abuses such quote stuffing, spoofing, pinging, or more discriminatory order anticipation and "statistical front-running" models. Many of the effects are correctly attributed to HFT firms, but are byproducts of large scale HFT scalping strategies rather than primary strategies in of themselves. 35 Moreover, conventional approaches to order execution employed by the buyside community may fail to achieve their goals: "Popular techniques to limit market impact, such as order slicing and various weighted averaging strategies, can backfire when they interact with HFT scalping strategies employing special order types and market microstructure features." 36 Nevertheless, despite doom-and-gloom forecasts for the securities market structure, the situation is changing, and a big chunk of credit should go to Bodek. One global observation is that "[s]ome of the more egregious HFToriented features appear to have been neutralized through order matching engine modifications."
37 One impetus for this cleanup was the revelation of specific instances of noncompliance with order matching rules at some trading venues, 38 whether true computer glitches or not. This trend is also illustrated by a quiet modification of the "sliding" order type-as a "non-controversial" change-by BATS.
39
In its turn, the SEC appears to apply greater scrutiny to order type proposals, which manifested itself in the recent disapproval of the "benchmark" order submitted by NASDAQ. 40 43 Some exchanges, notably, NASDAQ, have started providing more disclosure "specifically to allay concerns of unfair asymmetries in special order types," 44 and further progress may be expected. Similarly, NYSE Arca submitted a proposal-peppered with the word "clarify"-relating to its rules on order types and modifiers. 45 On a related note, IEX, a new trading venue with many innovative features, adopted a simple menu of order types and modifiers and emphasized that it has no features allowing "to discriminate . . . against specific order types" and that all of its order types are available to all users "in any capacity, on a uniform basis."
46 Also, as suggested by Bodek, the shift away from the use of special order types might be one of the key factors behind the much-discussed collapse in HFT profits, although he also stated that "this decrease is largely driven by reductions in overall market volume." 47 order types, many variations on order types . . . we have been asked by the SEC to withdraw them for a variety of reasons, having to do with their view of what is the appropriate market structure.").
41. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Computerized Trading: Part I, supra note 12, at 70 (prepared testimony of Larry Tabb, Chief Executive Officer, TABB Group) ("Exchanges, and for that matter [alternative trading systems], ECNs, internalizers and even brokers need to begin to provide greater transparency, descriptions, and concrete examples of how each order type works, how fees / rebates are generated, where they show up in the book queue, how and when they route out, and how these order types change under the various market conditions."). 43. Of course, the ambiguity of disclosure or its lack of specificity-for whatever reason-might subsequently create the incentive for trading venues to disclose information to a select group of market participants. More generally, the voluminous documentation generated by the wide variety of order types is often perceived as spam-like. 48 Furthermore, a powerful argument is that "the complexity of these order types that is adding unnecessary complexity to the market, which is already an extremely complex system as it is . . . not very well understood even by the most advanced participants, especially at how these different complex systems interact." 49 Even from the standpoint of technology, "in isolation, most of the order types made sense, but going back to the testing point and integration testing, the whole suite of order types . . . actually presents a pretty huge challenge . . . ." 50 Yet, given calls to simplify the current complexity of order type menus, 51 one thought-provoking observation is that the very existence of this complexity is symptomatic of the current state of the securities market structure, 52 which points to the necessity of deeper reforms.
III. ANY HOOK FOR HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADERS?
There are several possibilities to consider in the process of fitting the order type controversy under the coverage of the federal antifraud prohibition with respect with HFTs: (1) an order type simply has undocumented features; (2) an order type has undocumented features that potentially violate some regulatory norm under federal securities law, such as an SEC rule; and (3) the actual functioning of an order type contradicts its formal documentation in the form of a rule of a self-regulatory organization (SRO) filed with and approved by the SEC or another similarly vetted SRO rule, such as order matching rules of individual trading venues. . But see Steinert-Threlkeld, supra note 14, at 29 ("I don't think there are too many order types. A lot of the dynamic, fast-type trading that was taking place a couple years ago has sort of been arbitraged out of the market by the law of diminishing returns as more players entered and drove down profits.") (quoting Ian Winer, director of equities trading, Wedbush Securities).
52. See Senate Hearings on Computerized Trading: Part II, supra note 12, at 22 (remarks of Joseph Mecane, Executive Vice President and Head of U.S. Equities, NYSE Euronext) ("[T]he order type evolution is largely because the market structure that we have creates the need or the demand for different order types . . . .
[I]f we want to review the order type issue or simplify the markets, we should simplify the market structure that they operate in, and there will be less need for these order types.").
53. As noted earlier, Bodek compared the order type practices in question to other trading practices that are likely to be classified as manipulative, and, arguably, there is a meaningful difference between these two
The scenario of the mere existence of undocumented features applies to the case of nondisclosure-as opposed to false or misleading disclosure-of these features by trading venues. In theory, this scenario should be prevented by the mathematically precise nature of the disclosed documentation, but it is still feasible, while perhaps narrow in the legal sense, in light of the overall technological sophistication and complexity. Overall, this scenario would be the hardest one to apply for catching HFTs. Even if the behavior of trading venues actually amounted to deliberate concealment of certain order type features to the advantage-and knowledge-of HFTs as their preferred clients with a very material effect on other market participants, 54 it would have been difficult to attach some form of deception, duty to disclosure, or direct or implied misrepresentation to HFTs under the current jurisprudence relating to the federal antifraud prohibition. Furthermore, these market participants typically transact at arm's-length with others and, accordingly, are not subject to agency obligations. 55 Also, it would be hard to fit the order type controversy into the framework of insider trading regulation with HFTs being treated as "insiders," although these market participants are definitely on the "inside" in Bodek's analysis. Putting aside other doctrinal hurdles, the substance of an order type's functionality by itself does not have a direct impact on a security's market price-despite the fact that such an order type may take advantage of short-term price trends and fluctuations. After all, this functionality does not convey any "inside" or "outside" information affecting underlying companies or, arguably, even any confidential information about categories. See BODEK, supra note 3, at 9. Turning to the legal definition of manipulative practices under the federal antifraud prohibition, which are essentially synonymous with price manipulation, they have been defined as "artificially affecting market activity in order to mislead investors." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. 54. See BODEK, supra note 3, at 9 ("If you were an HFT, you were most likely provided entirely different marketing materials [by securities exchanges] than if you were an agency broker responsible for routing institutional orders."); id. at 5 ("The introduction of HFT-oriented special order types and related order matching engine practices for specific exchange [application programming interface] upgrades frequently resulted in an immediate and often severe impact upon the transaction costs associated with different classes of participants, often with HFTs benefitting at the expense of the rest of the exchange's customer base.").
55. While there is some case law favoring liability of broker-dealers for nondisclosure of certain characteristics of the underlying market for the security itself, its emphasis is on the existence of a customer- For the same reason, it is unlikely that the order type controversy could come under the doctrine of front-running, even though it is conceivable that some order types may be used for that purpose by HFT-style market participants engaging in both agency and principal trading: "[B]y definition [HFTs] are not able to pursue front running: They do not have customer flow and therefore no private order flow information that they could abuse." EUREX, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING -A DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT ISSUES 22 (2013) , available at http://www.eurexchange.com/blob/exchange-en/4038-4046/426058/2/data/presentation_hft_media_workshop_ chi_nyc_en.pdf. Although some HFT strategies are based on detecting "hidden liquidity" and anticipating other market participants' orders, they are outside the scope of front-running. For a discussion of "liquidity detection" strategies employed by HFTs, see PETER GOMPER ET AL., HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 28-29 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858626. the incoming order flow. 56 To go one iteration further, even if trading venues, as a result of their symbiosis with HFTs, disclosed order type-related information containing half-truths, let alone plainly false statements, 57 this hypothetical would hardly be sufficient to catch HFTs as primary violators. 58 On the other hand, there is a possibility of the SEC going after HFTs if another party, such as a securities exchange, is identified as a primary violator. 59 On a related note, the regulators are indeed looking into "whether exchanges have at times misled them in seeking approval for certain order types or mischaracterized to investors how the orders work," 60 which may potentially uncover something beyond mere nondisclosure.
One possible approach to the applicability of the federal antifraud prohibition to HFTs is to identify a violation of some regulatory norm under federal securities law in a way that defrauds other market participants. Putting away broader normative goals articulated in the federal securities statutes, the pivotal issue is whether specific order type practices directly contradict Regulation NMS, 61 especially its Rules 610 and 611 that address various aspects of order matching, such as the ban on locked and crossed markets and the "trade-through" principle. 62 Bodek himself referred to "the corruption of 62. Id. at 37,631-32 (to be codified at Access to Quotations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.610, and Order Protection Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.611). These rules are formulated as obligations of trading venues rather than obligations of market participants themselves, but some of them require trading venues to regulate their members in certain ways.
price-time priority" introduced by certain order type practices, 63 but he also noted the persistent efforts of trading venues and HFTs to fit these practices into the framework of Regulation NMS:
Modern HFT strategies thrived in the new electronic marketplace, seemingly tuned perfectly to the implementations of Regulation NMS that precisely dictated the inner working of the marketplace, including price movement and order handling. By circumventing the intent of Regulation NMS with a myriad of legal exceptions and clever regulatory workarounds, HFTs exploited fragmentation to their benefit at the expense of institutional investors. More generally, Regulation NMS did establish several foundations for order matching procedures, such as the "trade-through" principle, but it also granted a great degree of deference to individual trading venues. 67 Overall, violations of Regulation NMS are unlikely to provide a basis for civil liability of HFTs who use such orders because of their compliance-however formalistic-with this regulatory norm. In any instance, the bulk of the burden of compliance with Regulation NMS is on trading venues rather than individual market participants. With that in mind, Bodek's prescription is forcefully clear: "To address the market structure crisis head on, we need to reassess Regulation NMS in the context of its original purpose and intent-to bind a fragmented 63. BODEK, supra note 3, at 48. 64. Id. at 65. For instance, as described by Bodek, the DAY ISO, i.e., an "intermarket sweep order," "addresses conditions in which Regulation NMS puts constraints upon an order to simultaneously satisfy the ban on locked markets stipulated by Rule 610 and the trade-through rule stipulated by Rule 611" and has "the remarkable ability to step ahead of orders resting on the book at the same price." Id. Interestingly, one anonymous trader at an HFT firm provided the following description of the interaction between HFTs and trading venues, which hints at selective disclosure of queue jumping features: "We talk a lot to the exchanges, to optimise the order type for a given trade. Sometimes you'll want to pay the rebate and sometimes want to take it -but what's really essential is to jump to the head of the queue. You pay for it, but you jump to the head." Carver, supra note 27.
67. Regulation NMS itself uses the term "rules of priority and precedence" with respect to a "national securities exchange." 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,623 (to be codified at NMS Security Designation and Definitions, 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(65)(i)). The same term was used in Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,290, 48,329 (Sept. 6, 1996) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
marketplace into an effective national market system that serves long term investors." 68 Finally, if the actual functioning of an order type violates the underlying SRO rule or other order matching procedures in this SRO's rulebook and HFTs use this order type to take advantage of this discrepancy, there might be a private right of action under the federal antifraud prohibition. 69 As stated in a recent appellate decision in support of a private right of action in the context of violations of SRO rules:
[Such] rules themselves are part of the apparatus of federal securities regulation . . . adopted by notice-and-comment rulemaking (not by the mechanism of contract, which requires consent by all affected persons) and are subject to review and change by the SEC. Some of these rules are the source of legal duties, and not revealing to investors a failure to comply with one's duties about transactions in their securities can lead to liability under the [federal] securities acts. underlying trading process-under the federal antifraud prohibition as deceptive practices, given the existence of "a formal adjudicatory decision on the subject" by the SEC.
73
The administrative adjudication in question specifically based its demonstration of deceptive conduct on the assertion that "absent disclosure to the contrary by [ apply in other contexts," 77 and the regulatory agency's interpretation should be accorded at least some degree of deference. 78 Overall, the order type controversy appears to fit the pattern in order to extend the reach of the antifraud prohibition for violations of SRO rules to HFTs even if they do not directly communicate with or otherwise make explicit representations to other market participants. 79 Violations of SRO rules by HFTs should not be sheltered from liability even when the SRO in question is complicit. 80 However, the reach of the federal antifraud prohibition to these practices of HFTs is not a foregone conclusion, and a fact-intensive inquiry is still required. This inquiry is likely to hinge on the content of SRO rule filings related to order types and other SRO rules governing order matching procedures and the existence of specific violations. 81 
IV. PERILS OF SELF-REGULATION AND THE SCOPE OF REGULATORY IMMUNITY
The appropriate self-regulatory role of securities exchanges is one of the key considerations in the debate over the regulatory design of the securities market structure. 82 Bodek's suggestion to "[e]liminate the self-regulatory status of for-profit exchanges" 83 may sound like a drastic measure, although its implementation may take various-and milder-forms. However, it is hard to argue with his qualification that, "[a]t the bare minimum, for-profit exchanges must be frequently scrutinized by regulators to ensure that their business development interests are not compromising their ability to maintain fair and non-discriminatory markets." 84 It is also hard to disagree with Bodek's assertion that SROs' conflicts of interest are "a very real systemic risk to the marketplace." 85 Yet, rather than restricting experimentation with different business models via rulemaking under the protection of the SRO status and thus possibly threatening true innovation-despite the continuing presence of some perverse incentives-there are other feasible resolutions of the crisis of self-regulation in the securities industry. One possibility is a voluntary delegation or even a mandatory transfer of enforcement and surveillance functions by SROs to a third party, such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). 86 On the other hand, the rulemaking function would not be outsourced under this scenario, still leaving in place various conflicts of interest.
Another approach lays in testing-or perhaps reexamining-the boundaries of regulatory immunity of SROs, 87 given the for-profit status of trading venues and their corresponding profit-generating activities. 88 The doctrine of regulatory immunity acts as a shield deflecting private-but not government-lawsuits from securities exchanges and certain other entities, such as FINRA, in their capacity as SROs 89 for official actions in the context of the broad regulatory scheme established by federal securities law. 90 The coverage of this doctrine is extensive: it is enjoyed even in cases of fraudulent conduct, including claims under the federal antifraud prohibition. 91 88. In addition to the doctrinal analysis, a public policy perspective pertains to potential distortionary impact of regulatory immunity of SROs as for-profit entities, given the forces of competition in today's securities markets. See, e.g., Letter from Theodore R. Lazo to Mary Jo White, supra note 83, at 7-8 (arguing that, "as exchanges have converted into for-profit enterprises, most, if not all, of their activities have become commercial in nature and not deserving of immunity" and, " [w] ith exchanges seeking to engage in more broker-dealer-like activities, the risk grows that exchanges will claim that more of these commercial ventures are entitled to immunity based on some incidental regulatory aspect"). 92 Still, by definition, SROs may be subject to private lawsuits for their activities as private businesses. Indeed, in that respect, securities exchanges are not-or should not be-different from trading venues that do not enjoy the protection of regulatory immunity, such as alternative trading systems / ECNs, which are not registered as SROs. 93 One potential problem lays in distinguishing official and private activities of a trading venue, as it may function:
[A]s an SRO within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act . . . which vests it with a variety of adjudicatory, regulatory, and prosecutorial functions, including implementing and effectuating compliance with securities laws; promulgating and enforcing rules governing the conduct of its members; and listing and de-listing stock offerings [and] as a private corporation [that] may engage in a variety of non-governmental activities that serve its private business interests, such as its efforts to increase trading volume and company profit, as well as its daily administration and management of other business affairs.
94
On the surface, it is hard to fit the order type controversy on either side of the official-private distinction, as the trading venue-HFT symbiosis, while very much profit-oriented, is in fact regulation-based and relies on formal procedures, including the SEC's approval. On the other hand, this judicial pronouncement does not imply that "governmental" activities by definition preclude profit-based motivations. In fact, several courts have specifically adopted this position, 95 although there has been some doctrinal struggle between function-and motive-based factors.
96
Furthermore, representative cases piercing SROs' regulatory immunity have been made under the circumstances appearing substantially less "official" compared to the role played by securities exchanges in the order type controversy, such as several advertisements featuring or implicitly referring to a listed company 97 or actions relating to calculations and dissemination of price information for an index. 98 Indeed, the protection of regulatory immunity was extended in similar controversies involving allegations of special preferences given to a select group, such as that the SRO is question " [in] 100 or set an ex-dividend date in violation of a court order and the Exchange Act in order "to protect the interests of its members who had profited by trading in cancelled shares."
101
False or misleading disclosures relating to SRO rule filings are connected to a regulatory activity with even less ambiguity, and the existing case law analogously shielded an SRO from allegations of misstatements in a proxy solicitation relating to the bylaws' amendments in order to create a consolidated SRO, with these amendments subsequently approved by the SEC, 102 and refused to scrutinize a manner of announcing regulatory decision by an SRO. 103 In addition, a securities exchange may specifically disclaim liability-via SEC-approved rules-for certain activities potentially relevant for the order type controversy. For instance, NASDAQ's Rule 4626(a) states that, subject to certain limitations, including a special compensatory scheme for the Facebook IPO glitch: Nasdaq and its affiliates shall not be liable for any losses, damages, or other claims arising out of the Nasdaq Market Center or its use [including those] related to a failure of the Nasdaq Market Center to deliver, display, transmit, execute, compare, submit for clearance and settlement, adjust, retain priority for, or otherwise correctly process an order, Quote/Order, message, or other data entered into, or created by, the Nasdaq Market Center . . . . 104 However, one state case, which is somewhat of an outlier, allowed the plaintiff to proceed with claims against an options exchange and a clearing agency under state law, including various antifraud provisions of the applicable securities statute, for alleged selective disclosure of information relating to a strike price adjustment to certain market participants. 105 The court concluded:
[W]hile the price adjustment itself may have been a regulatory decision, the manner in which it was disclosed-privately and prematurely-to the John Doe defendants was not. . . .
[The] defendants . . . did not publicly announce this regulatory decision: the price reduction was privately disseminated only to certain market participants, and that disclosure did not serve any regulatory or governmental purpose.
106
A vocal dissent criticized the majority opinion in Platinum, describing the plaintiff's claim against the SROs as aiming at "their participation in a system to generate revenue by disclosing material information to insiders, [in order] to circumvent the doctrine of absolute immunity and distinguish this case from the well-established precedent that has found absolute immunity for an SRO's announcement of its regulatory decisions and acts." 107 The dissent further stated that "an allegation that an SRO announced a regulatory decision in a manner that failed to inform all market participants simultaneously fails to move a claim outside the ambit of the SRO's delegated power and, thus, outside the scope of the SRO's regulatory immunity," 108 referring to a prior decision that involved allegations of selective disclosure by an SRO of its regulatory actions to certain market participants. 109 Ultimately, the takeaway in Platinum is in several parallels between its circumstances and the order type controversy, namely selective disclosure of information that created advantages in the trading process for a select group in connection with a regulatory action. Accordingly, this decision creates an avenue for pursuing securities exchanges involved in questionable order type practices at least in state courts under state law. 110 Overall, while Bodek's contributions may serve as a guide for reforming the self-regulatory framework, they are unlikely to lead to a successful piercing of the immunity shield of SROs-at least in federal courts-in the absence of a judicial about-face. On the other hand, state courts may create some commotion, perhaps resulting in a significant monetary liabilities or preemptive settlements for securities exchanges. Once again, a fact-intensive inquiry will be required in order to prove or suggest the existence of SROs' fraudulent conduct.
V. TRADING OBLIGATIONS AND PRIVILEGES OF MARKET MAKERS
The regulatory framework applicable to market makers as providers of liquidity remains an important issue. On the other hand, the scope of "market making" is more uncertain, as liquidity is provided by both formal, i.e., designated, market makers with trading obligations and privileges and HFTs as informal market makers without such obligations and privileges, which, however, may receive special incentives in the context of the maker-taker pricing model. 111 Furthermore, HFTs may mix market making and proprietary trading, such as statistical arbitrage, and, accordingly, it is potentially difficult to delineate these two categories. 112 However, this mixture of trading strategies is by no means novel, 113 and it is likely to have been practiced rather 140-47 (2013) . In his turn, Bodek argued that some HFT scalping strategies "are favorably subsidized by rebate [sic] in the maker-taker market model." BODEK, supra note 3, at 20. Furthermore, he criticized the tiered rebate structure employed by some trading venues and suggested "a reduction in the fee cap . . . to encourage the development of more robust volumes on exchanges running alternative market models." Id. at 70-71. For a discussion of the origins and evolution of the makertaker pricing model, see PATTERSON, supra note 2, passim.
112. Letter from Manoj Narang to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 68, app. at 9. It is also illustrative that GETCO, now known as KCG after the merger with Knight Capital, one of the leaders of the HFT industry, had recently described virtually all of its short-term trading activities on the principal basis as "market making." Knight Holdco, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4) 74-75 (Feb. 13, 2013) 113. For instance, some market makers in English securities markets in the mid-nineteenth century, often by both formal and informal market makers. Moreover, the incentive to mix market making and proprietary trading has been reinforced by the abolition of the "negative obligation" applicable to designated market makers by several trading venues, notably, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
114
Another observation is that traditional institutional investors have not really emerged as major providers of liquidity, despite having been expected to do so, and potential reasons may include specialization, expertise, and intermediation / agency problems. 115 Bodek himself admitted that he used to subscribe to the misconception that HFT "was simply another name for automated or electronic market making." 116 In his opinion, a troublesome set of strategies employed by HFTs only resembles traditional market making:
HFT scalping is predatory in its aim of stepping ahead of institutional order flows. It can be characterized as an opportunistic and discriminatory mimic of traditional market making-where HFT uses opaque advantages, including special order types, instead of explicit market making privileges-without the market making obligations. It is not a traditional spread-scalping strategy that posts on each side of the spread, relying on speed to jump ahead of the rest of the market.
117
Bodek proposed the following solution to this problem and related concerns: To the degree that advantages and asymmetries exist in the market for certain classes of participants, such advantages must be made completely transparent and for the most part should be associated with adequate performance in meeting market maker obligations. The movement away from official market maker roles at many venues has resulted in an overall market environment where the "new market makers" (i.e. HFTs) share no responsibility in serving the investing public, maintaining fair and orderly markets, or developing concentrated order flow sources into the venue. The rewhich were described as "speculative jobbers," might have employed this approach. that "designated market makers" would no longer be subject to "a specialist's negative obligation not to trade for its own account unless reasonably necessary to the maintenance of a fair and orderly market").
115. Compare Paul Brakke, Commentary on On the Existence of an Optimal Tick Size, 10 REV. FUTURES MKTS. 75, 76 (1991) ("[W]hy couldn't pension funds, for instance, be the market-maker? They have very large inventories of assets and pretty much zero cost of inventory since they are already long in these assets. It seems to me that the pension funds are in a much better position on any given trade to take a position, and are much better capitalized than any market-maker on the floor. The only thing missing is . . . the electronic hookup to a centralized exchange."), with EDGAR PEREZ, THE SPEED TRADERS: AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT The early vision of obligation-and privilege-free-and perhaps merely automated-market making shared by many financial economists 121 now appears idealistic if not naïve. Even without debating whether a certain group of market participants has or should have the abstract duty to "serve the public," it appears that obligation-and privilege-free market making is often economically inefficient, and one potential explanation is that liquidity in securities markets has characteristics of an externality/public good and hence requires explicit or implicit subsidies for its providers. 122 The weight of empirical research, in fact, indicates that the existence of trading obligations of market makers-balanced with privileges-tends to improve market quality in many instances. 123 One empirical study even points to the importance of "a market maker obligated to maintain a market" in the context of liquid securities during a period of extreme volatility exemplified by the Flash Crash of May 6, 2010, 124 although pushing such obligations to the extreme scenario of "catching a falling knife" is bound to be counterproductive. 125 A relatedbut distinct-question is whether HFTs are currently providing additional liquidity in securities markets, given their coexistence with designated market makers on many trading venues, and this question is a part of the explosion of empirical research on HFT. 126 Furthermore, any improvements in liquidityor some of its dimensions-introduced by HFT have to be balanced against other potential consequences. 127 In fact, a recent empirical study of transactions in stocks on NASDAQ found that "HFT increases the trading costs of traditional institutional investors," 128 as expressed by execution shortfall, a multidimensional measure that "captures the bid-ask spread, the market impact, and the drift in price while the ticket is executed," 129 and this finding may have a connection to the order type controversy. Moreover, the study concluded that, "if anything, HFT represents an ephemeral and expensive source of liquidity provision to institutional investors" 130 and suggested that "the electronic market making strategies employed by [HFTs] also increases institutional trading costs, although at a smaller magnitude relative to the case when [HFTs] engage in direction trading."
131 By contrast, another empirical study analyzed transactions in stocks on the London Stock Exchange and found that HFT has no effect on institutional investors' execution costs, as captured by "the bid-ask spread, market impact and price drift while executing the order." 132 One implication of the growing attention on trading obligations and privileges of market makers is their potential liability for violations and abuses of such obligations and privileges under federal securities law, including its antifraud prohibition. 133 For instance, there is some evidence that the ban on "stub quotes" is still frequently broken by market makers. 134 While keeping in mind that several order types on specific trading venues are available only to designated market makers, 135 another interesting issue is whether the use of certain other order types by these market participants constitutes a violation of their trading obligations.
The issue of civil liability of market makers in connection with their trading obligations and privileges under federal securities law is not new under the moon, and even the SEC several decades ago had reservations about a broad reach of private lawsuits in such circumstances:
Given the inherent uncertainty in the practical application of the general standards of "affirmative" and "negative" specialist obligations, and the subjective basis of judgments thereon . . . the imposition of civil liability for failure to conform to these obligations could well have been regarded as inappropriate. In addition, any civil liability that might arise could be of a farreaching nature. It might extend not only to investors with whom specialists had improperly engaged, or failed to engage, in transactions, but also to persons who claimed that the prices at which they effected transactions among themselves were adversely influenced by the specialist's action or inaction. 136 Yet, the argument for the reach of the federal antifraud prohibition remains viable-even in the context of trading obligations and privileges set by SRO rules, which often have a high degree of specificity. 137 Furthermore, given the inherently limited scope of this prohibition, merely negligent or involuntary violations by market makers would not be covered. As an illustration, while commenting on yet another electronic glitch, Bodek made the following observation: "[Y]ou have to question if the exchange itself has provided an adequately safe environment for meeting market maker obligations. Did the exchange implement adequate risk controls in the order matching engine and to what extent were the parameters set intelligently and/or audited by the market maker and exchange?" 138 
VI. THE DUTY OF BEST EXECUTION
Given the sophistication of execution strategies and techniques exposed by the order type controversy, one key question pertains to the role of the brokerage community acting on behalf of non-HFT market participants. Bodek observed that securities exchanges and HFTs themselves are playing the blame-shifting game by arguing that "sell-side brokers and their buy-side clients . . . were negligent in developing adequate competencies in the appropriate use of exchange features commonly exploited by HFTs" despite the fact that these features were communicated "in an exclusive and nonpublic manner." 139 However, looking forward, this situation might change: "As the issues of exchange order handling continue to be reviewed, I expect to see additional pressures on execution service providers to demonstrate greater competency for fulfilling best execution fiduciary duties using the advanced exchange features." 140 This perspective is particularly important because a violation of the duty of best execution may trigger liability under the federal antifraud prohibition. 141 Furthermore, a representation of best execution outside a customer-broker relationship-for instance, by an exchange specialist-may similarly be actionable under the same rationale. 142 The duty of best execution is deemed to be "a broker's bedrock obligation," 143 which has a long history. 144 One frequently cited precedent provides the following definition of this duty:
The duty of best execution, which predates the federal securities laws, has its roots in the common law agency obligations of undivided loyalty and reasonable care that an agent owes to its principal. Since it is understood by all that the client-principal seeks his own economic gain and the purpose of the agency is to help the client-principal achieve that objective, the broker-dealer, absent instructions to the contrary, is expected to use reasonable efforts to maximize the economic benefit to the client in each transaction. 145 In other words, complying with this duty requires a cost-benefit analysis of efforts exerted by a broker. Furthermore, as noted by some commentators, "Owing to rapid changes in technology and market practices, it is not always possible to define what efforts by the broker-dealer to seek best execution of a customer's order are 'reasonable.'" importance of private data feeds provided by individual securities exchanges: "[A] broker-dealer [does not] need to purchase depth-of-book data in order to meet its duty of best execution (which requires it to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain favorable order execution terms for customers)." 148 In any instance, the emphasis of the case law on best execution has been on breaches of the duty of loyalty, 149 given the multiplicity of roles played by many securities firms and corresponding conflicts of interest, rather than the duty of care, which is more relevant for the concern described by Bodek. 150 One court articulated that the execution of certain complex orders-for instance, "not-held" orders, which are specifically designated by customers as such-requires a higher level of effort from the standpoint of the duty of best execution. 151 But what about the necessity of using special order types to accomplish more general objectives in the absence of specific instructions of a customer? 152 In general, the diffusion of knowledge about trading practices and specific tools offering superior execution is not instantaneous: it is a dynamic process. On the flip side, " [b] ecause the scope of the duty of best execution is constantly evolving . . . broker-dealers have long been required to conform customer order practices with changes in technology and markets." 153 While some order type features may be-or have been-undocumented, there is a learning curve, and, as trading venues are cleaning up their practices and moving toward greater transparency, the "reasonableness" hurdle may be surpassed. 154 Given the taxonomy of the duty of best execution, which includes "the duty to execute promptly; the duty to execute in the appropriate market; and the duty to obtain the best price,"
155 the choice of an order type may potentially influence all of these dimensions. For instance, using a "wrong" order type may result in a worse price, delayed execution, or even its non-consummation. 156 Analogously, different trading venues may have order types with varying degrees of attractiveness for a given objective.
VII. CONCLUSION
Bodek's analysis offers a diagnosis-and a promise-for securities markets. Technological developments cannot be reversed, and the search for regulatory arbitrage and loopholes cannot be stopped, but their adverse impact should be contained to the extent possible. In any instance, despite its evolution, the securities market structure may look very different in the near future: "HFT strategies will still exist, but their role will once again be limited by their natural scale and volume."
157 Rewinding back to today, some of the problems described by Bodek can potentially be addressed by the existing tools of federal securities law, including private lawsuits, although other problems are beyond its current reach, which requires changes in the regulatory design itself.
Once again, Bodek's chief contribution is in unleashing the order type controversy, which may die in a quiet manner with the continuing cleanup or go out with a bang. While the explosion in the number of order types often reflects the adjustment of securities markets to the new fragmented, hypercompetitive, and computerized architecture, this diversity is also a result of the symbiosis of HFTs and trading venues, which appears to have led to additional layers of complexity and informational asymmetry accompanied by nontransparent transfers of wealth. Putting aside the sunlight's deterrence effect demonstrated by the recent order type-related changes in the securities industry, there are several feasible approaches to such questionable practices under the federal antifraud prohibition. Once again, the issue of proof is complex, as it would require a forensic reconstruction of a multitude of transactions, a comparison with an alternative universe based on the "correct" trading protocol, an access to the underlying code, and details of secret communications between trading venues and certain market participants. [owed by a broker to a customer] in a particular situation, a court may consider a variety of sources, including the rules of the self-regulatory organizations, the internal rules and practices that the brokerage firm has adopted to govern the conduct of its employees, industry custom, and professional practice.").
155. Id. § 16.03 [B] . 156. See, e.g., BODEK, supra note 3, at 41 ("[B]rokers unfamiliar with the necessity and nuances of accessing HFT-oriented markets with [intermarket sweep orders] in fast moving markets limit the liquidity available to their clients and leave many orders unfilled, a practice that effectively shields HFTs from toxic marketable order flows and subsidizes the profits of HFT scalping strategies.").
157. Id. at 8.
